COMMENT
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
UNDER AMTRAK AND ASH:
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLICATION
In 1916, the Supreme Court announced the doctrine of implying private actions in the absence of specific statutory authorization in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby.' Rigsby, a
railroad employee, sought damages for injuries resulting from
2
his employer's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
The Court upheld his recovery while recognizing that the Act
did not expressly confer a private right of action: "A disregard
of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from
the party in default is implied .... -"3The relatively novel question whether a court can and should imply an action for an
injured party who has no express statutory remedy has sparked
a great deal of judicial commentary, the volume of which reflects
the courts' inability to fashion workable and generally applicable
standards of implication.
Two recent cases, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of RailroadPassengers4 (Amtrak) and Ash v. Cort,5
are manifestations of the problems in this area. Rather than
attempting to reconcile the inconsistencies in earlier decisions,
these cases preserve and, to some extent, increase the difficulty
of determining when a private action should be implied.
Through an analysis of these two cases and the precedents upon
which they rely, this Comment will attempt first to show where
the courts have erred in formulating standards for implication,
and then to propose reasonable and consistent alternative standards.

1241

U.S. 33 (1916).

2 Ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).

1 241 U.S. at 39.
4 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
5496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the existence of the doctrine of implying a private
action is so widely accepted that its underlying justification is
rarely discussed by the courts, an analysis of the rationale behind
implication is an appropriate starting point for evaluating the
considerations that are or should be central to the implication
decision.
As a basic proposition, it may be asserted that when Congress enacts legislation it does so in order to accomplish particular goals. Congress may achieve its purpose by regulating or
prohibiting actions that offend those goals, but generally such
regulations or prohibitions are only as effective as the statutory
sanctions behind them. Unfortunately, Congress must often decide upon penal and remedial schemes without a prior opportunity to evaluate their practical effectiveness. What on paper
appears to be an efficient and complete system of enforcement
may in fact do little to curb the practices that offend an act's
purposes.
Courts, on the other hand, are able to observe a statute in
operation and to determine the actual effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism. Recognizing this ability, courts have acknowledged both the propriety and the wisdom of implying pri6
vate actions to fill the lacunae left by Congress.
This reasoning suggests that there are two essential elements
in a test for implication. First, an implied private action must be
consistent with the goals of the act in question. Second, an action
should be implied only when the enforcement scheme adopted
by Congress is found to be inadequate to attain Congress' goals,
and when a private action is thus needed to correct the inadequacy.
The history of the doctrine of implication has been notably
discordant. Courts have created private actions for violations of
many types of federal statutes, including an act making it a crime
to intercept telephone conversations,7 an act designed to assure
to every eligible citizen the right to vote," and a statute proscribing false and deceptive practices in the solicitation of proxies.9
6
See J.i. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
285, 291 (1963).
7 Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C.
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a),
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

432-33 (1964); Note, 77 HARV. L. REV.
U.S.C. § 605 (1970); see Reitmeister v.
§ 1973 (1970); see Allen v. State Bd. of
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); see J.1. Case Co. v.
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The test most favored in the early history of implication was a
standard much like that used by courts in determining the relationship between statutory violations and the common law of
torts: Disregard of a statutory command which damages an intended beneficiary of that statute creates a cause of action in the
injured party. 10 Because the vast majority of acts are intended to
protect a specific group, this early test, if literally applied, would
support implication in almost every federal statute. But these
statutes often have other goals. Such a test does not consider
whether an implied action would disparage potentially conflicting goals," nor does it require a court to examine the effectivescheme and, therefore, the
ness of the existing enforcement
2
need for private actions.'
This early standard fell into disfavor during the 1950's
when, perhaps because they sensed the unworkable breadth of
the test, courts became less willing to imply private actions.
Rather than meeting the challenge of formulating a narrower
test which would more precisely serve the underlying rationale
of implication, some courts fashioned rules of construction
which limited the situations in which an implied action could be
found consistent with the underlying statute. One lower court,
new
for example, said that if a statute creates "new rights ,...
remedies must be found within the statute."' 3 Another court
stated that if an act primarily benefits the public at large and no
equivalent private action exists at common law, implication is
inappropriate. 4 Still other courts limited implication by narrowly defining the class of a statute's intended beneficiaries' 5 or
by circumscribing the remedies available to a plaintiff in an implied action.' 6 The Supreme Court itself sought to limit the doctrine in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service

10Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); see Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d
Cir. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 461-64 (1974); cf. Holloway %'.Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 21-22
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12 Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1946).
13 Acorn Iron & Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 96 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
14 Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 941 (1953).

15Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
16 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1961). Contra,
J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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Co. 1 7 and T.LM.E. Inc. v. United States.18 These cases suggest

rigid rules for determining the necessity of implied actions, thus
significantly qualifying the liberal test of damage to an intended
beneficiary.
The Court held in Montana-Dakota that where a federal
agency is in the first instance entrusted with the enforcement of
a statute, but is limited to affording only prospective relief, a
court may not imply an action granting retroactive relief, even
though primary jurisdiction problems could be largely eliminated by the court's referral to the agency of questions within
the agency's expertise.' 9 The T.LM.E. Court grafted still another
qualification onto the doctrine of implication. When a statute is
divided into parts, each of which is intended to govern the same
basic conduct (albeit of different groups or persons), and one
part of the act provides an express private remedy for a violation, implication is not available for violation of a part of the act
that contains no express private remedy. 20 In T.LM.E., motor
carriers were thus denied a private action challenging tariff
charges in the absence of a specific grant because shippers by rail
and water were expressly granted such rights in other parts of
2
the Interstate Commerce Act. '

This panoply of standards and presumptions, although
formulated in reaction to an overly broad test for implication,
confused the implication process by failing to state a generally
applicable test in accordance with the underlying implication
theory. Furthermore, the T.LM.E. and Montana-Dakota tests are
too narrow. They would preclude implication even if a private
cause of action in a given situation would be consistent with the
statutory goals, and even if the enforcement scheme would be
inadequate without it.
17

341 U.S. 246 (1951).

18 359 U.S. 464 (1959).

19341 U.S. at 251; T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1959). The
Court retreated somewhat from this strict position in 1962 when it implied an action
based on the same statutory scheme as that involved in T.I.M.E. Hewitt-Robins Inc. v.
Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962). For a general discussion of the relationship between these two cases, see notes 211-18 infra & accompanying text.
20 359 U.S. at 470-77. Some judges have read this rule to mean that if any section of
an act contains express private remedies, implication is inappropriate for all other sections. See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 427 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 302 (1974); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (W.D. La.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Stewart v. Travelers
Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 111-12 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). This rule is
discussed more fully at notes 162-71 infra & accompanying text.
21 359 U.S. at 470-72.
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The tide turned dramatically in favor of implication in 1964
when the Supreme Court decided J.L Case Co. v. Borak.22 In
finding an implied action for a violation of the proxy solicitation
rules promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,23 the Court held that a private action may
be fairly implied when: (1) the plaintiff is within the zone of
interest intended to be protected by the statute; (2) the harm is
of the type that the statute was intended to forestall; and (3) the
penalty is inadequate to effectuate Congress' purpose in passing
24
the statute.
This formulation was dominant for a number of years as the
federal courts liberally construed rights of action in many federal statutes. 2 5 The test does cure one defect in the earlier formulation, which focused solely on the intended beneficiaries of the
act in question, by requiring a full investigation of the express
enforcement and remedial provisions as a means of assessing the
need for private actions. In focusing on the beneficiary, however, a court may imply a remedy when it deems the enforcement scheme inadequate, even though such implication is inconsistent with the multiple and potentially conflicting statutory
goals. This test is therefore too broad.
Some federal courts have recently revealed a sense of dissatisfaction with the imprecision of the Borak test. But rather
than dealing head on with that test's weaknesses, they have chosen to limit implication by way of statutory construction. 2 6 This
has created a situation most notable for its confusion. A court
required to make an implication decision has no single reasonable test to apply, but rather is confronted with two conflicting
but equally vital lines of precedent-one line seeking to limit
22 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
24This three-part test is never explicitly stated in the Borak opinion. The rule has
been extracted from the opinion by later decisions, but it has been treated as the Borak
test. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967); cases cited
note 25 infra. To avoid confusion, and for the sake of consistency, the test will be
referred to as the Borak test throughout this Comment.

21 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Stewart v.
Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974); Burke v. Compania Mexicana Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031
(9th Cir. 1970); National Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399
(D.D.C. 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
26 See, e.g., Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690
(M.D. Fla. 1974); People for Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D.
Cal. 1974); Danna v. Air France, 334 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 407 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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implication, and the other, beneficiary-oriented line favoring
implication. This state of affairs is especially undesirable; it invites judges to make decisions based upon their predilections
and permits them to justify their results by choosing between the
lines of precedent, thus foreclosing all hope of predictability and
consistency.
II.

RECENT APPROACHES TO IMPLICATION:
AMTRAK AND ASH

Two recent cases, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na27
tional Association of RailroadPassengers (Amtrak) and Ash v. Cort,28
have emerged from the inconsistent lines of precedent. These
cases are benchmarks in the evolution of the implication doctrine
not because they provide a solution to the confusion, but rather
because they tend to accentuate it. An examination of the approaches taken in Amtrak and Ash must precede a discussion of
the relationship of these two cases to a general theory of implication.
A.

The Amtrak Litigation

1. The Court of Appeals
In Amtrak, a national organization of railroad passengers
alleged that the discontinuance of certain passenger trains violated the Rail Passenger Service Act of 197029 (the Amtrak Act).
The district court, in an unreported opinion, dismissed the
organization's suit to enjoin the discontinuance, 30 holding that
the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action. This decision
was reversed in a lengthy opinion by Judge Skelly Wright. 3' Like
the district court, the court of appeals decided the case on the
basis of standing, but, the court noted, "analyzing the case under
the doctrines of ...private causes of action achieves an identical
'32
result.
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
29 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970). The trains formerly had been operated by the Cen27
28

tral of Georgia Railway Co. The plaintiffs argued that because Central Georgia's parent
company, Southern Railway Co., did not contract with Amtrak, it could not relieve itself
of only part of its inter-city passenger service responsibility; the Amtrak Act authorizes
contracts under which Amtrak assumes a railroad's entire responsibility. 45 U.S.C. §
561(a)(1) (1970).
11 Civil No. 831-71 (D.D.C., May 5, 1971).
31Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453 (1974).
32Id. at 329.
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Although Amtrak is a private-for-profit corporation, the
court found it sufficiently "quasi-public ' 33 to warrant the use of
the standing test developed by the Supreme Court in Association
of Data Processing Service Organizationsv. Camp 34 (DataProcessing)
for parties who wish to challenge administrative action. This test
consists of three parts: "(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged that
he suffered injury in fact, economic or otherwise . . . ; (2)
whether the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question... ;
and (3) whether judicial review has been precluded by the
legislature. '3 5 For two reasons, employing this standing test
greatly simplified the solution to the problem whether to imply a
private action. As with the early liberal tests for implication, the
first two prongs of this test focus on the intended beneficiaries of
the act, essentially eliminating the need to look for possibly countervailing goals of the statute.3 6 The court found these prongs
easily satisfied, as the appellant had alleged that some of its
membership would suffer from discontinuance, and as the Am37
trak Act clearly was intended to protect railroad passengers.
Also, in applying the third prong of the test, the court was able
38
to avail itself of a strong presumption in favor of reviewability.
Having expressed this presumption, the court proceeded to
find a legislative intent to permit judicial review in the terms of
the Act itself. Section 307 of the Amtrak Act provides that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction upon petition of the
Attorney General to grant equitable relief for any action by Amtrak or a member railroad inconsistent with the Act, or, in a
labor dispute, upon petition of an employee or his authorized
representative. 39 The court rejected the expressio unius est exclusio
11 Id.

at 330.
M 397 U.S. 150 (1970).

15 475 F.2d at 329 (citations omitted); see 397 U.S. at 152-56.
36 See notes 10-12 & 22-25 supra & accompanying text.

37 475 F.2d at 331-32 (citing congressional findings and declaration of purpose in
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act) § 101, 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970)).
38 475 F.2d at 331; see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
39 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1970):
(a) If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any action,
practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and purposes of this chapter,
obstructs or interferes with any activities authorized by this chapter, refuses,
fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or
threatens any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, the district court of the United States for any district in which the Corporation or other person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as
otherwise prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the
United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any
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alterius40 maxim of statutory construction, which would seem to

have been controlling because Congress had specifically granted
the right to bring civil actions to a carefully defined group. 4 ' As
the court noted, however, the rule has been limited and, to some
extent, discredited by the Supreme Court as being "subordinated
to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in
conformity with its dominating general purpose .... ,,42 The
court further noted:
It seems reasonable to us that the express provision
of standing for the Attorney General was not an attempt to bar other injured and aggriev6d parties from
bringing suit, but rather an attempt to authorize the Attorney General to bring suit to enforce
what otherwise
43
might be viewed as private rights.
This proposition received the court's support for several
reasons. First, because the Attorney General can seek equitable
relief for threatened violations, his powers are broader than
would be those of a private litigant. In order to assure judicial
recognition of these broad powers, therefore, Congress specifically enunciated them. 44 Additionally, said the court, if this section were read to limit the initiation of actions to the Attorney
General only, then member railroads and Amtrak would themselves be unable to sue one another for damages caused by a
violation of the Act-a result that the court believed was not
intended. 45 Regarding the action accorded employees and
unions, the court felt that such a specific grant was necessary
because "[C]ongress might well have feared that under the Data
Processing standing test employees and their representatives
would not have been considered members of the class intended
to be protected by the legislation .... 46
employee affected thereby, including duly authorized employee representatives,
to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or
terminate any violation, conduct, or threat.
(b) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving any
person of any punishment, liability, or sanction which may be imposed otherwise
than under this chapter.
40 Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
41 For a general discussion of this maxim and its application to implication, see notes
145-60 infra & accompanying text.
42 475 F.2d at 332 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1943)).
43 475 F.2d at 332; see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
44 475 F.2d at 333.
45 Id.
46Id.
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In striking contrast with the Supreme Court's ultimate
decision, 47 the court of appeals found the legislative history of
the Amtrak Act inconclusive at best. Despite the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee's rejection of an
amendment to section 307 which would have expressly permitted private actions, 4 8 and despite the comments of organized
labor and the Secretary of Transportation that the section as
enacted did not provide private actions,4 9 the court could find
no positive intent to preclude private actions. Because the rejected amendment never had been debated, the court felt justified in maintaining that "[t]he Committee might well have believed ...that Section 307 as originally drafted did not bar suits
by all injured and aggrieved parties. ' 50 Finally, the court observed that if Congress had wished to preclude private actions, it
easily could have done so by inserting the word "only" before
"upon petition of the Attorney General '5 1 in the same way that it
52
explicitly denied judicial review under section 202 of the Act.
The court of appeals also found support in the Act's purpose for its decision to permit the association to bring an action.
While recognizing the congressional intent to enact a scheme
that would allow the expeditious discontinuance of uneconomical passenger trains, 53 the court stressed the primary purpose of
revitalizing rail passenger service, that is, preserving currently
54
economical routes and protecting passengers on those routes.
The court saw private actions as furthering this goal without
sacrificing administrative efficiency, noting that suits under the
Act cannot challenge the discontinuance of passenger lines
where there is a mere assertion of "public convenience and
necessity, ' 55 as under the old law, but only where the discontinuance violates the specific provisions of the Act. 56 The need
for private actions was made even more compelling by the Attorney General's definition of his role under the Act as exclud-

" See notes 67-68 infra & accompanying text.
Is 475 F.2d at 335.
49
Id. at 334-35.
50
Id. at 335.
51 Id. at 336.
52 45 U.S.C. § 522 (1970).
.3

475 F.2d at 336-37; see H.R. REP. No. 91-1580, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970);

Hearings on H.R. 12084 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation & Aeronautics of the House
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1969).

" 475 F.2d at 337; see H.R. REP. No. 91-1580, supra note 53, at 1-2.
15 Interstate Commerce Act, pt. I, § 13a(1), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1970).
56 475 F.2d at 337-38 n.13.
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ing the power "to sue for a construction of the Act or to enjoin a
purely technical violation.15 7 Finding no inconsistency with the
statutory purpose, the court determined that this potential inadequacy of enforcement was sufficient to warrant standing for
private litigants, lest those
subject to the Act achieve effective
58
immunity in its violation.

Having determined that the appellants had standing, the
court easily dispensed with the problem of implication. Because
the Act was intended to protect the interests of railroad passengers, and because those interests were arguably involved in this
case, the court adopted the Borak rationale 5 9 and recognized an
implied private action.
By deciding Amtrak on the basis of standing, the court was
able to use the presumption in favor of reviewability to dispense
more easily with factors such as legislative history which, at least
in part, argued against implication. Additionally, the standing
test, by focusing solely on the plaintiff and his relationship to the
statutory purpose, did not require a deeper analysis of those
other congressional goals that might not be served by
implication. 60 This use of the standing test provides at least one
explanation for the Supreme Court's dramatic reversal of the
61
court of appeals' decision.
2. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, began its
opinion in Amtrak with an analysis of the language of section 307
of the Amtrak Act. 62 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice

Stewart, found no evidence in this language to support a cause
of action in the association. When no such support for a private
action can be found, the majority indicated, reliance must be
placed on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius absent
"clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. '63 Unlike the court
of appeals, 6 4 the Supreme Court did not cite those cases that
recommend that only limited reliance can be placed on the
57 Id. at 338 (quoting Letter from Assistant Attorney General L. Patrick Gray, III, to
Congressman John Slack, Nov. 19, 1971).
5' See Wood v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 341 F. Supp. 908 (D. Conn. 1972).
59 See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.
60 The use of standing tests to imply actions is discussed generally at notes 10 1-21
infra & accompanying text.
61 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974).
62 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970); note 39 supra.
63 414 U.S. at 458.
64 See note 42 supra.
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maxim; 65 instead, the Court ignored this earlier criticism and
invested the rule with a new vitality. The Court literally said that
when Congress has enacted a remedial scheme (which is usually
the case), a strong presumption against implication arises which
can be rebutted only by Congress' positive indication that it did
in fact intend private actions to coexist with the statutory
scheme. This approach was thus directly opposed to the lower
court's application of a presumption favoring reviewability and,
ultimately, implication. 66 Not surprisingly, the two courts
reached opposite results.
Having raised this presumption against implication, the
Court searched unsuccessfully for positive evidence of legislative
intent to rebut it. Rather than minimizing the importance of the
legislative history, the majority interpreted congressional silence
and inaction as positive evidence of an intent to deny a private
remedy, completely rejecting the court of appeals' analysis that
such evidence was inconclusive: 67 "Although the transcript of the
House Committee hearings does not indicate that any Committee member voiced explicit affirmative agreement with this interpretation, it is surely most unlikely that the members of the
Committee
would have stood mute if they had disagreed with
it."' 68 If the lack of positive evidence of an intent to permit private actions, despite a silent record, were sufficient in itself to
defeat an implied action there would be little life left in the
implication doctrine.
Having found that the language of the statute and the legislative history weighed heavily against an implied action, the
Court went on to read the purpose of the Act in the same light.
Stressing the Act's goal of creating an expeditious and efficient
process to eliminate uneconomical passenger routes, the majority
concluded that limiting the right of action to the Attorney General would most effectively promote that purpose. 69 The Court
pointed out that a private litigant had no recourse to the courts
under prior law if the Interstate Commerce Commission determined that it was unnecessary to conduct an investigation prior
to a discontinuance under section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act. 70 Certainly, the Court reasoned, Congress could not
6-See notes 40-43 supra & accompanying text.
" See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
67 See notes 48-49 supra & accompanying text.
68 414 U.S. at 460.
" See text accompanying note 54 supra.
'0 414 U.S. at 462 n.9.
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have intended to make the streamlined procedures under the
Amtrak Act less efficient in this respect than the cumbersome
administrative procedures it intended to replace.
Further, the Court suggested that Congress had provided
adequate protection for rail passengers. The opinion quoted the
conclusion of a House of Representatives report that "a rational
reduction of present service will be required in order to save any
passenger service."' 71 The Court later stated, "In light of the
substantial scrutiny to which Amtrak operations are subject by
both Congress and the Executive, Congress could quite rationally suppose that this remedy will effectively prevent and correct
any Amtrak breaches of obligations under the Act. '7 2 In these
two statements the Court appears to have said that although a
private litigant may indeed feel harmed by a discontinuance and
therefore desire a private action, in reality such an action would
jeopardize the continued availability of any rail passenger service
by prolonging the lifetime of uneconomical routes through long
court battles. Thus, it may be said that Congress substituted as
one of its purposes the overall public interest in passenger service for the private interest in a single route when it designated
the Attorney General, with his national perspective, as the enforcement agent. Denying an implied action under this analysis
would do more than serve the administrative efficiency goal; it
would also advance the ultimate purpose of the Act to protect all
railroad passengers through the creation of a viable, profitable
network of rail passenger service.
By looking no further than the Act itself, however, the
Court never determined whether, in retrospect, the statutory
structure as implemented was sufficient to protect the interests
of rail passengers. The majority did not mention the Attorney
General's failure, up to that time, to bring suit against either
Amtrak or a member railroad because of his limited view of his
73
role in the Act's enforcement.
In contrast, Mr. Justice Douglas relied heavily on this apparent inadequacy of enforcement in his dissent. He dismissed
the majority's statutory construction by saying, "The most I think
that can be drawn from the words of 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) and the
legislative history is that Congress wanted to make sure that
some federal agency had some oversight over the public activity
414 U.S. at 461 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-1580, supra note 53, at 3.)
414 U.S. at 464 (footnote omitted).
73The relationship of adequacy of enforcement to implication is discussed generally
at notes 204-63 infra & accompanying text.
71
72
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of this private-for-profit corporation. '7 4 He supported this reading by quoting from Allen v. State Board of Elections,75 in which
the Court found a similar grant to the Attorney General of authority to bring suit not preclusive of private actions. His fear
that a denial of private actions would "make nonreviewable most
of Amtrak's decisions" 76 convinced him of the need for implication. If the Attorney General is unwilling or unable to act when a
violation of the statute is alleged, reasoned Mr. Justice Douglas,
the courts have an obligation to allow private parties to take up
the slack. By using the Borak test,7 7 he found this inadequacy
sufficient to justify implication in this case in light of his view of
the purpose of the Act-"to protect the people who ride the
78
trains."
In rejecting both the Data Processing standing approach of
the court of appeals and the Borak beneficiary approach of Mr.
Justice Douglas, the Amtrak majority appears to have limited severely the liberal trend of the 1960's toward implication, and
indirectly may have rejected it entirely. The apparent presumption against implication raised in the Court's opinion, if literally
applied by the lower courts, is almost irrebuttable, because a
positive legislative intent to imply private actions will rarely be
found. How the lower courts will interpret this decision remains
speculative. But despite the apparent narrowness of the Amtrak
opinion, at least one court of appeals was able to avoid its harshness and continue along the line of precedent relying on Borak.
B. Ash v. Cort
The litigation in Ash v. Cort79 began on the eve of the 1972
presidential election. An owner of fifty shares of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation common stock filed a derivative action against
the corporation's directors to enjoin the publication of an allegedly partisan campaign advertisement and to recover advertising expenditures 80 allegedly made in violation of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act as amended by the Federal Election Cam74

414 U.S. at 468.

,5 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
76 414 U.S. at 471. Even if implication were permitted, however, many decisions of
Amtrak would remain unreviewable by the terms of the Act itself. See, e.g., Amtrak Act §
202, 45 U.S.C. § 522 (1970) (decision as to "basic system" not reviewable).
7 See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.
78 414 U.S. at 471.

79 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 496 F.2d 416, cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302
(1974).

8 The request for injunctive relief was mooted by the passing of the 1972 election.
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paign Act of 1971.81 The gravamen of the complaint was that an
advertisement sponsored by Bethlehem and containing excerpts
from a speech by Stewart S. Cort, Chairman of the Board of
Bethlehem, amounted to a partisan expenditure sufficient to violate the Act, which by its terms provides only criminal sanctions.
The district court, deciding the case before Amtrak had been
handed down, had no difficulty denying an implied action; 82 the
court held that shareholders were only secondary beneficiaries
of the Act and not, therefore, entitled to an action absent an
express indication of legislative intent so to provide.
On appeal, the oral argument before the Third Circuit
panel occurred only eight days after the Supreme Court's Amtrak
decision had been filed, 83 but that case was argued before the
court and was considered in its decision. 84 Despite the forceful
directive of the Supreme Court, Chief Judge Seitz easily sidestepped Amtrak's negative effect on the implication doctrine.
Writing for a majority of the panel, he cited Amtrak merely as a
case "where the legislature clearly has indicated its intent to...
withhold a cause of action .... -"85 This analysis is only partially
correct because it ignores the apparent presumption against implication raised by the use of expressio unius.86 The court of appe-

als justified its conclusion by holding that although expressio unius
was properly applied in Amtrak, it was not available in this suit:
For the Amtrak rule to apply, the statute must expressly provide the plaintiff a remedy that may logically
be said to be exclusive ....

In the instant case no ex-

press civil action is provided to remedy plaintiffs, or
any other, alleged injury. Only a criminal sanction is
expressly provided for violation of § 610. Courts have
consistently held that statutes providing for criminal
liability 7 do not preclude assertion of private causes of
action.

8

By eliminating the rationale that supported the presumption
against implication in Amtrak, the court of appeals felt justified in
81 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II, 1972).
82 350 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

' 3 Ash was argued on January 17, 1974. 496 F.2d at 416. Amtrak was decided on
January 9, 1974. 414 U.S. at 453.
84 See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 3, Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 95 S.Ct. 302 (1974).
's

496 F.2d at 421.

See notes 63-66 supra & accompanying text.
87 496 F.2d at 421-22 (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,

200-02 (1967); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-41 (1916)).
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eliminating the presumption itself. In doing so, however, the Ash
court did not consider whether the granting of an implied action
88
might violate the spirit of the Amtrak opinion.
Having thus disposed of Amtrak, the court relied on the
Borak rationale8 9 to justify implication. The court found that the
Act was intended to protect the individual voter by assuring his
ability to elect a government responsive to his wishes and not to
those of big business; the plaintiff, as a voting citizen, was an
intended beneficiary of the Act. But the court went on to state,
"As a stockholder, plaintiff is within the class secondarily protected by § 610, which keeps control over political contributions
in his hands and not in those of corporate managers or
directors." 90 The expenditure of corporate funds in violation of
the Act, the court held, would harm the plaintiff in the ways
intended to be prevented by the statute. The court rejected the
contention that because the class to be protected by the Act was
the entire American public, and therefore indefinable, no private action could be implied. For this proposition the court relied on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of
Narcotics,9 ' in which a private right of action was implied for
injuries suffered by an individual as a result of a violation of the
fourth amendment, even though that amendment was intended
to protect the whole citizenry. The court also found a
shareholder's derivative action proper, despite the secondary nature of the protection afforded this class. The secondary protection was considered to be important protection nonetheless and
not preclusive of implication 92-- notwithstanding the opinion of
93
the district court.
Having satisfied the first two prongs of the Borak test by
finding that the plaintiff was within the zone of interest and that
the harm caused was of the type intended to be prevented by the
Act, the court proceeded to find private action consistent with
the purpose of the Act. Two main considerations supported this
holding. First, the covert nature of unlawful contributions generally makes their detection difficult, hindering effective governmental prosecution and limiting the adequacy of the criminal
sanction. 94 A shareholder with an economic stake in the action
88496 F.2d at 428 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
89 See notes 22-26 supra & accompanying text.
90 496 F.2d at 422.

91403 U.S. 388 (1971).
92 496 F.2d at 423.

93350 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
94496 F.2d at 423.
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could provide a vigilant supplement to enforcement by the Justice Department. Secondly, and this seems to be the real reason
behind the court's action, the same Executive who allegedly had
benefited from the expenditures in question was in charge of the
Act's enforcement through his duly appointed Attorney
General.95 While not deciding that a conflict of interest actually
partisan enexisted, the court did say that the potential for
96
forcement was sufficient to warrant implication.
Judge Aldisert, convinced that the majority had violated the
clear command of Amtrak, vehemently dissented. He read the
literal language of the Amtrak majority to "consciously and deliberately appl[y] the brakes" 97 to the use of implication by changing the test from the liberal Borak rule to the more conservative
rule that Congress' provision of an explicit enforcement scheme
creates a presumption against implication that can be rebutted
only by clear evidence of legislative intent to the contrary. He
viewed Congress' failure expressly to include a private action in
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as a significant indication that Congress did not intend private actions to exist under
this Act. 98 Finding no positive evidence to rebut the presumption, Judge Aldisert determined that section 610 could not support a private action, derivative or otherwise.
Judge Aldisert obviously welcomed the narrow construction
of implication announced by the Amtrak majority: "The Supreme
Court's entreaty for restraint in Amtrak is justified. Otherwise a
reasoned case for an implied private right of action could be
constructed within the framework of every federal criminal statute simply by showing that plaintiff is 'within the class Congress
sought to protect by prohibiting' certain conduct." 99 Although
this may be an accurate observation, the particular formulation
advocated by Amtrak, as interpreted by Judge Aldisert, may go
too far in the other direction. If the presumption against implication is raised at the outset, the whole doctrine may lose its
vitality.
The doctrine of implication has reached an important crossroad; federal courts deciding whether to imply are now faced
with three choices: (1) construing Amtrak strictly, as did Judge
Aldisert, to limit implication severely; (2) attempting to narrow
95 Id.

96 Id. at n.7.

97 Id. at 429.
98 Id. at 427.
99Id. at 428.
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or avoid Amtrak and to continue to apply the earlier, more liberal precedents which in effect implied a damage action whenever the violation of a statute harmed an intended beneficiary
of that statute; 0 0° or (3) attempting to use Amtrak to arrive at
workable standards of implication which avoid the extreme positions represented by the Ash dissent and the beneficiary-oriented
precedents. Clearly the third course would do the most to draw
rationality and consistency from the current confusion of implication. Through an analysis of the elements that courts traditionally have employed in making the implication decision, the
remainder of this Comment will attempt to sift out those considerations that are truly central to implication.
111.

STANDING AND ITS RELATION TO THE

IMPLICATION DECISION

A.

The Rationale of the Standing Requirement

The court of appeals in Amtrak remarked that "[t]he fine
distinctions among the doctrines of standing, jurisdiction, reviewability, and causes of action often pose thorny problems for
the law."''° This is so principally because courts have confused
the elements of these doctrines.
In the determination of standing, "the question is whether
the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the
issue itself is justiciable.' 0 2 The rationale behind this rule is to
assure that the claim as presented to the court constitutes a "case
or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution.10 3 Where a statute provides the remedy sought by
the plaintiff for an alleged violation, the question of standing
becomes merely whether the plaintiff has alleged injury in fact
or sufficient threat of actual injury to ensure that the issues will
be fully elucidated-that is, whether the plaintiff has " 'a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' "104 Federal
courts have held, however, that when the plaintiff is asserting a
challenge to an action for which he has no clear statutory author100 See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.

101 Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 329 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
102 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968) (footnote omitted); see Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
103 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968).
0 4
'
Id. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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ity, more than just an allegation of injury is required to confer
standing. 10 5 Because the plaintiff in an implication case is asserting the right to a remedy beyond the ones granted by the statute
in question, it might appear initially that the decision should be
based on the doctrine of standing; but a closer analysis of the
relationship of standing and implication reveals the distinctiveness of the two doctrines.
The standing doctrine is used frequently where a plaintiff is
challenging the authority of a particular action by the legislative' 06 or executive' 0 7 branches on the ground that such an
action allegedly violates the constitutional or statutory rights of
the plaintiff. The question of standing focuses on whether the
challenging party is the proper one. The implication question,
on the other hand, arises when a party, relying upon a statute,
seeks affirmative recovery for harm caused by the violation of
the statute. Certainly the standing doctrine is important for the
purpose of assuring that the party seeking implication is the
proper party to do so, but the essential inquiry in the implication
context is whether the action itself is a proper action. The significance of this difference will emerge more clearly upon examination of the Data Processingtest' 0 8 and its use by the Amtrak
court of appeals.
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,Inc. v.
Camp,'0 9 the plaintiff challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of
the Currency that allowed banks to provide data processing services. The ruling allegedly violated section 4 of the Bank Service
Corporation Act," 0 which states that banks may provide only
banking services. This case was not one in which the plaintiff was
asking the court to create a private right of action; it was brought
under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
allows private parties to challenge administrative rulings when
allegedly aggrieved by such action."' Because the Court recognized its own limited ability to judge the interpretation given a
statute by the executive charged with the statute's enforcement
l15 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972) (assertion of third party
rights); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(challenge of administrative ruling); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer's suit to
challenge constitutionality of federal appropriations statute).
106See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
'17 See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
1 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
109 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
110 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970).
"115 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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and application, it laid down a three-part test: that plaintiff allege injury in fact, that he be within the "zone of interests"
created by the statute, and also that the legislature not have
precluded judicial review. 1 2 The Court was not attempting to
solve an implication question; rather, it was attempting to find a
way to screen potential plaintiffs early in the suit so that challenges to administrative actions would be brought by plaintiffs
with sufficient interest to ensure a complete, adversary presentation of the issues.
The prongs of the Data Processing test may be viewed as
requiring only a limited inquiry into the purpose of a statute to
satisfy a court that the statute is intended to protect the plaintiff
and that the administrative action is reviewable. In determining
standing, a court need not delve into the broader goals that the
act is intended to serve; that inquiry comes with an adjudication
on the merits." 3 It is precisely this failure to consider the broad
statutory goals that renders the Data Processing test untenable as
a basis for implication.
B. Standing in the Implication Context
If the Data Processing test were applied to implication cases,
the courts' investigation would be at once too broad and too
narrow. The Third Circuit panel in Amtrak had no difficulty in
concluding that an organization of railroad passengers was
clearly within the relevant zone of interest because the statute
was intended to revitalize and protect the continued existence of
rail passenger service, 1 4 thus satisfying the second prong of the
Data Processing test. Although this is undoubtedly an accurate
assessment, in the context of the implication decision it too
broadly favors the granting of a cause of action. If a court were
narrowly to apply the first and third prongs of this test (allegation of injury in fact and judicial reviewability), the "zone of
interest" inquiry would provide the sole opportunity to consider
the overall purpose of the act in question." 5 Because the second
prong of the test is phrased purely in terms of intended ben112 See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
113 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970).
114 475 F.2d at 331 (quoting the declaration of purpose in the Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act) § 101, 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970)).

'I- Indeed it seems likely that the first and third prongs of the Data Processing test
would be viewed strictly. The question of reviewability obviously requires an investigation
of the statutory purpose only as it relates to reviewability and the inquiry into harm is
itself extraneous to the statutory analysis.
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116
would extend beyond that consideration.
Even if a court is willing to consider the broader purposes of
an act in its analysis of reviewability, as did the Amtrak court of
appeals, 1 7 such an analysis is still likely to be heavily influenced
by the concern for intended beneficiaries: "When Congress seeks
to protect a group such as railroad passengers, we may reasonably imply, absent express and definite indications to the contrary, that Congress intended this group to have judicial relief to
achieve the protection Congress intended.""" And quite apart
from the effect of the intended beneficiary concept, a court is yet
faced with a strong presumption in favor of reviewability."l 9 Although this presumption may be appropriate for a liberal standing test, it serves only to obscure the underlying rationale in the
implication area.' 20 Judicial review and implication are two dis12
tinct questions and should remain so. '
A determination that an implied action is both consistent
with a statute's purposes and needed to correct the inadequacy
of Congress' enforcement scheme for effectuating the statute's
goals cannot be satisfactorily based on a test that is concerned
primarily with the attributes of a particular plaintiffs allegations.
Although it is quite possible that a plaintiff seeking to imply an
action will fail to meet the standing test, that decision must be
recognized as different from and preliminary to an implication
decision.

IV.

THE IMPLICATION DECISION:

CONSISTENCY AND NECESSITY

A.

Consistency: Ascertaining Legislative Intent

Once the question of standing is resolved, courts can proceed to deal with the complexities of the implication decision
itself. The first inquiry in resolving this problem involves a
search for legislative intent. Because implication is invariably
beyond the explicit scope of the congressional enactment, courts
See text accompanying note 35 supra.
F.2d at 336-38.
1 Id.at 340.
119
Id. at 331 (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970)).
120See notes 62-66 supra & accompanying text.
If the literal language of the Supreme Court in Amtrak is followed, however, the
presumption may go the other way.
121 See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 176-78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring &
dissenting).
216

117 475
18

1412

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1392

are careful to insist that an implied action be consistent with the
statutory scheme lest the courts usurp legislative power. But implication itself is a form of judicial legislation, inasmuch as it
cannot accurately be said that Congress has created the action
permitted by the courts; nevertheless, courts have recognized the
need for implied private actions.
Perhaps this tension between the limitations of a federal
court's power and the perceived need for implied actions accounts for the somewhat schizophrenic attitude toward implication among the courts. Whatever the cause, this schizophrenia
appears most frequently in the analysis of relevant legislative
intent. Some courts say the search for intent is an attempt to
divine a specific desire on the part of Congress to permit or
preclude private actions; 2 2 other courts claim that the purpose
of this analysis is to determine what Congress' overall goals were
in enacting the statute and whether implication comports with
those goals. 1 23 Occasionally these competing formulations appear in the same opinion.' 24 Whichever approach is taken, the
inquiry basically involves analysis of three component parts: (1)
legislative history; (2) statutory construction; and (3) statutory
purpose.
1. Legislative History
The search for relevant legislative history to determine
whether Congress contemplated resort to private actions without
specifically providing for such actions in the statute has proven
futile. Given the nature of implication, this is not surprising. If
Congress had considered the matter of private actions to such an
extent that it appeared in the history of the statute, this consideration would probably be reflected in the statute itself by a
declaration that stated remedies are exclusive or that private
actions do or do not exist. The question of implication would
then never arise. Commentators have found this search into
legislative history for specific intent to imply to be of "little
assistance."1 2 5 One author has said that "the process of deciding
whether to imply a cause of action is more likely to be hindered
122E.g., Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
123 E.g., Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974);
National Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
124 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
461 (1974).
125 61 HARV. L. REV. 858, 860 (1948).
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narrow context of a search for
than helped when placed in 2the
6
tokens of legislative intent.'
In addition to being futile, the scouring of reports and hearings is irrelevant to the essential criteria and underlying rationale
of an implication test. Insofar as the central rationale for the
implication doctrine is that it serves to fill significant gaps in the
enforcement scheme created by Congress, 127 it would be illogical
to expect Congress to have contemplated the existence of those
lacunae at a time when it thought it was creating an enforcement
system extensive enough to ensure an act's vitality. Implying a
private cause of action assumes that Congress did not perceive
the need for this remedy; efforts to discover such perceptions
are therefore misdirected.
For the most part, interpretation of legislative history in this
narrow context has been an excercise in interpreting congressional silence-a questionable enterprise at best. Some courts
have held that a silent legislative history indicates that private
actions were not intended, 1 2 8 while other courts have viewed
silence merely as an indication that Congress failed to consider
the issue and not as a bar to implication. 12 9 If a test for implication that fully considers the broader issues is desired, then the
second approach is preferable because it avoids the digressions
that doom the implication process from the start. Indeed, the
logic of the assertion that silence precludes implication is no
more convincing than the assertion that "[i]f Congress wishes to
preclude judicial consideration of issues concerning the implication of a private action under a statute, it needs only to say so
expressly in the act itself or in the legislative record."' 30
Occasionally, though the statute itself remains silent, the
legislative history deals explicitly with implication through its
converse-exclusivity. This does not usually take the form of a
clear directive, but rather provides an indication that the question of the existence of private actions received some

226

Note, supra note 6, at 291.

'27See text accompanying note 6 supra.
'21 See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted,

95 S. Ct. 302 (1974); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); cf. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 20
(D.D.C. 1971), affd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
129 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1967);
Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 111 (9th Cir. 1974); Burke v. Compania
Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970).
12' Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 111 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974).
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consideration.' 3 ' This was the situation in Amtrak. Confronted
with the same legislative record, however, the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court arrived at strikingly different
conclusions.' 3 2 This disparity indicates the unreliability of legislative history that is less than unequivocal on the question of private actions. Neither court necessarily erred in the weight it gave
to the testimony or to the committee's failure to adopt an
amendment permitting private actions, but in devoting so much
energy to an analysis of these isolated statements and actions,
both courts risked losing sight of the more vital criteria of implication. Although neither court seems to have ended its analysis
here, because both considered the broader question of statutory
purpose, a court of lesser stature might be tempted to resolve
the whole implication issue on tidbits of legislative history.' 33
The disparity in interpretation in Amtrak also illustrates that
inconclusive legislative history can be used to support almost any
position. If a court with a particular disposition toward the implication question elevates legislative history to a conclusive level,
the court may arrive at a judgment in agreement with its view
of implication without considering the more important questions
of statutory consistency and need.' 3 4 The warning of the Amtrak
court of appeals is well taken: "Courts should avoid delving into
'legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish
dubious bases for inference in every direction.' "135
This is not to say that the legislative record does not have a
function in the implication process. Indeed, it is of great significance, but this significance stems from its value as a tool in determining the overall purpose of the act in question-one of the
crucial elements of the implication decision. The majority and
dissenting opinions in Ash demonstrate the contrast between this

13 This is so because if the legislative history is unequivocal in its denial of private
actions, the statute will probably reflect this firm stance.
132See text accompanying notes 47-52 & 67-68 Supra.
133 Cf. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted,

95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
134The Supreme Court almost committed this error in Amtrak. By attributing sub-

stantial weight to the legislative history against implication, however, the Court was able
to avoid a clash with the Borak rationale. But the Court enunciated a standard which
could severely limit the Borak test. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974).
135 Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 335 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) (quoting Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945)).

1975]

IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

positive use of legislative history and the dubious use outlined
above. The court of appeals majority analyzed the remarks of
various Congressmen to determine whom Congress intended to
protect and why this protection was considered important. 13 6 In
doing so, the court progressed toward a logical development of
the purpose of the Act and a rational decision on the question of
implication. In contrast, Judge Aldisert concluded that "the
Congressional history is devoid of any reference to a private civil
remedy.' 137 This short-sighted view of legislative history led the
judge to the very "deduction from events of wholly ambiguous
38
significance" warned against by the court of appeals in Amtrak.1
2. Statutory Construction
The second area of inquiry in divining the purpose behind a
statute involves a study of the statutory language itself. As with
legislative history, the nature of implication is such that courts
should not expect to find specific, positive indications that Congress intended the remedies provided to be exclusive. Occasionally a statute states that the remedies provided are exclusive' 39 or
indicates clearly that private actions are not available by denying
the courts jurisdiction. 40 Even when evidence of exclusivity is
fairly strong, however, some courts have looked beyond the enforcement scheme itself to decide
whether implication would
41
serve the overall goals of the act.'
When exclusivity is not clearly indicated, the federal courts
are torn between conflicting positions. Certainly it must be said
that the primary responsibility for enacting an enforcement system rests with Congress, and courts are loath to invade this area
of legislative prerogative. At least one court has determined that
when a federal statute creates new rights not existing at common
law, the only available remedies are those found within the
statute itself.' 42 Other cases have held that implication is inap136 Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.Ct.,302 (1974) (citing
117 CONG. REc. 43379-81 (1971) (remarks of Representative Hansen); 117 CoNG. REC.
43384-85 (1971) (remarks of Representative Thompson)).
137496 F.2d at 428.
138 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
139See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, pt. I, §§ 5(7),(8),(1 I), 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(7),(8),(11)
(1970).
14 See, e.g., Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act) § 202, 45 U.S.C. § 522
(1970).
141See, e.g., Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969). Contra, Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974); Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
142Acorn Iron & Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 96 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa.
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propriate unless Congress has created a right without a corresponding remedy or a right with a remedy so inadequate that it
143
must have intended private enforcement.
In contrast to these somewhat extreme lines of reasoning is
the position that recognizes the deference to be paid to the congressional formulation but also recognizes the limitations upon
Congress imposed by its necessarily limited perspective when
enacting legislation. Courts that adopt this position view the
enactment of an enforcement scheme by Congress as an expression of a desire to protect fully the rights it has created in the
statute. Implication effectuates that desire by providing a rem144
edy needed to accomplish that protection.
As with legislative history, the better approach for courts to
take is to recognize that only limited reliance can be placed on
congressional silence about exclusivity. Such an approach allows
courts to avoid being sidetracked from a full analysis of the
statutory purpose.
Some courts have not been so willing to accord a limited role
to statutory construction and instead have created a set of rules
that tends to enhance the significance of the express remedial
provisions of a statute to the detriment of implication. Perhaps
the most heavily criticized and yet most enduring of these rules
is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.145 The exact scope
of the rule has troubled courts for many years. On the one hand,
some courts give it the broadest possible construction by saying
that it may be invoked when any scheme of enforcement is specifically provided. 46 This formulation, if carried to its logical conclusion, would eliminate implication because almost every federal statute contains some specific enforcement provisions. In
contrast to this broad view are those cases that apply the maxim
only to statutes containing a remedy similar to that sought by the
plaintiff but specifically granted only to another class of plaintiffs. As the Ash court said: "For the Amtrak rule [relying on
1951). See generally Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 1963)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
143See, e.g., Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1392-94 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973).
144 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.
Ct. 302 (1974).
145 Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
146 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974); People for Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F.
Supp. 589, 591-92 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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expressio unius] to apply, the statute must expressly provide the
plaintiff a remedy that may logically be said to be exclusive....
In the instant case no express civil action is provided to remedy
plaintiff's, or any other, alleged injury. 1 47 Under this formulation, statutes containing only criminal penalties would not be
148
subject to the maxim, thus leaving room for implication.
Whatever restrictions are placed on the expressio unius rule, it
remains subject to criticism by courts 14 9 and commentators.1 50 As
one court has said, in a context unrelated to implication:
The doctrine ...

is at best an unreliable basis for ascer-

taining intention. Its premise is that the draftsman has
made a comprehensive review of all possible related
provisions, from which the inference is to be drawn that
his silence indicates a discriminating judgment of rejection. Such a conclusion usually is unrealistic, for it assumes too much foresight in the draftsman.' 5'
This criticism is particularly relevant in the context of implication, where private remedies may be justified because at the time
of enactment Congress was unable to foresee the need for such
remedies. Expressio unius destroys this rationale by attributing to
Congress an unrealistic omniscience.
A maxim that is relied upon to mean so many different
things in effect means very little, and courts should eliminate it
entirely to render the implication process reasonable. The reliance on the rule by the Supreme Court in Amtrak,' 5 2 however,
has apparently invested the rule with a new vitality. Courts may
therefore feel constrained to follow the maxim restrictively in
future implication cases. Three possible alternatives may be suggested. The first, pointed out by Judge Aldisert in his Ash dissent, would be the least desirable because it would effectively end
implication: allow the maxim its broadest application to raise an
147Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
148 Cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
149 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943); Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. 475 F.2d 325, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974);
Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 810
(1961).
150 Note, supra note 6, at 290-91; cf. H. HART. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1173-74 (temp. ed. 1958).
15, Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 719 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
15 See notes 62-66 supra & accompanying text.
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almost irrebuttable presumption against implication. Even the
Amtrak Court did not suggest that it intended to overrule the
large body of precedent which has recognized the value and
propriety of the implication doctrine.
The second alternative is that taken by the Ash majority,
described above. 15 3 The disadvantage of this approach is that in
cases involving statutes that provide the remedy sought by the
plaintiff, but for another class of plaintiffs, a court may feel
unable to avoid the maxim, thus thwarting a proper investigation
of the appropriateness of implication.
The third approach to the problem is suggested by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stewart v. Travelers
Corp. 15 4 In implying a private cause of action for a violation of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 155 which forbids the discharge of an employee because of wage garnishment for one
indebtedness, 156 the court distinguished cases employing expressio
unius to preclude implication, and added that "the utilization of
the expressio unius rule to construe congressional intent in each
' 57
case was but one argument supporting the court's holding.'
This suggests that courts do not use the maxim to arrive at the
implication decision, but rather employ expressio unius merely to
support their conclusion after having decided on other grounds
that implication is not appropriate.
A comparison of the Supreme Court's opinion in Amtrak
with its decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections'5 8 provides
additional support for the proposition that courts use expressio
unius as a makeweight. In Allen, the Court was confronted with a
remedial scheme under the Voting Rights Act of 1965159 which
resembled that established under the Amtrak Act, whereby the
Attorney General was authorized to bring civil suits to enforce
the Act.' 60 The Court found that the Act's purpose was to make
the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment a reality for all citizens and that the achievement of the Act's goals would be "severely hampered . . . if each citizen were required to depend
solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney

"' See notes 147-48 supra & accompanying text.
154 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).

155 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
156Id. § 1674(a).
151 503 F.2d at 111 n.8.
158 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
159
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-p (1970).
,6 . Id. § 1973j(d) (1970).
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General."' 6 1 The court implied a private cause of action and
found no need to discuss expressio unius. The Amtrak court, on the
other hand, found no need to discuss Allen. It may well be that
expressio unius was not central to the Amtrak decision, but simply
buttressed the Court's view that implication under the Amtrak
Act would interfere with the statutory purpose. If courts would
accept even this characterization of expressio unius, they could
better consider the implication issue on its own terms.
Another technique of statutory construction which fits
under the expressio unius heading has developed from the Supreme Court's opinion in T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States.162 There
the Court refused to imply a cause of action under section 216 of
the Motor Carrier Act,163 which requires motor carriers to
charge reasonable rates and declares unreasonable rates unlawful, but which provides no damage remedy to a shipper once
unlawful rates have been assessed and paid. Part of the Court's
argument for refusing a damage action to an injured shipper
was that those parts of the Interstate Commerce Act that apply
to railroads (Part I) and to water carriers (Part III) establish a
similar duty to charge reasonable tariffs but provide express
damage actions to the shipper injured by a violation of this duty.
Because all three parts of the Act were so similarly structured on
this point, the Court found a congressional intent to withhold
164
the damage remedy from shippers by truck.
It must be stressed that the Court in T.LM.E. was not trying
to circumvent an analysis of the Act's purpose by establishing a
convenient rule of statutory construction; rather, it was using
statutory construction properly as an aid in divining that
purpose. 65 Some judges, however, have decided that T.LM.E.
stands for the proposition that implication is unavailable when
any section of an act other than the one under which plaintiff
has brought suit provides an express private action.' 6 6 This interpretation suffers all the weaknesses of the expressio unius
maxim. First, as the Ash court of appeals stated, it is often mere
161393 U.S. at 556.
162 359

U.S. 464 (1959).
163Interstate Commerce Act, pt. II, § 216(b),(d), 49 U.S.C. § 316(b),(d) (1970).
164

359 U.S. at 470-71.

165This becomes more apparent in a later decision by the Supreme Court in which
an action was implied under this section. Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways,
Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962); see notes 211-16 infra & accompanying text.
166 Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 427 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 302 (1974); cf. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1958);
Ferland v. Orange Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 706 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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coincidence that two particular sections are joined in one statute,
making it totally inappropriate to compare their respective remedial provisions.16 7 Second, special considerations not applicable to the relevant section may have caused Congress to provide
an express civil remedy in another section of the act.
This has been the interpretation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,168 which provides explicitly for private rights of
action in some sections, 169 but nevertheless has been held to
support implied actions under other sections. 170 As one commentator has said, those sections of the Act that provide expressly for civil liability
establish special rules of damages, rules affecting burden of proof, and statutes of limitations. They may
merely reflect an intention to modify the remedies
which might otherwise be implied. Failure expressly to
authorize liability in other sections may therefore indicate only that Congress did not intend
to qualify the
17 1
liability arising from their violation.
For these reasons, expressio unius as a supposed rule of
statutory construction should be firmly rejected, not only because it raises questionable presumptions which hamper the ability of courts to decide the implication question rationally, but
also because the doctrinal underpinnings of the rule are dubious
at best.
Just as courts should not use the expressio unius maxim to
erect presumptions against implication, neither should they use
statutory construction to raise presumptions in favor of implied
actions. In his vigorous dissent in T.LM.E., Mr. Justice Black,
joined by three of his brethren, suggested that the existence of a
saving clause, which preserves preexisting remedies not inconsistent with the Act, 1 72 might support a decision to imply a federal
cause of action in that case.' 73 Such an approach is questionable
because a saving clause, as its name suggests, does not purport to
167 See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 421 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974);
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 7-8, Ash v. Cort, id.
168 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
169Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 16, 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, p, r, t (1970).
17' See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)).
171 61 HARv. L. REV. 858, 861 (1948).
172 Interstate Commerce Act, pt. II, § 216(j), 49 U.S.C. § 3160) (1970).
173 T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 483, 490-91 (1959) (Black, J., dis-

senting).
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create new remedies. Only two conclusions may be drawn from
the existence of a saving clause: First, the clause applies only to
preexisting remedies, and second, it applies
only to those reme74
dies that are not inconsistent with the act.1
If saving clauses were found to be germane to implication,
courts would still have to determine whether implied actions
were consistent with a particular statute. In essence, a court
would, in part, be doing what it should do when it makes the
implication decision. Despite the parallelism, however, the two
standards may not involve exactly the same considerations. It is
probably the wiser course to keep the tests separate, as courts
have done for the most part, in order to avoid the kind of confusion that has already resulted from multiple tests for implication.
In addition, even with an inquiry into statutory consistency, reliance upon a saving clause for implication would ignore the
question whether a particular private action were needed in
order to correct inadequacy in the provided enforcement
scheme.
As far as implication is concerned, the most that can be said
for the existence of a saving clause is that it evinces a congressional view that a private action is not necessarily inconsistent
with the act in question. 175 Although this does not ultimately
decide the issue of implication, it may reassure some courts of
their power to imply and assuage any feelings that they are
usurping a legislative function. Even this use of such clauses
demands a cautionary note, however, because if courts express
their dependency on this as a justification for implication, they
may create a presumption that in statutes without saving clauses,
implication is inappropriate-just the type of presumption that
should be avoided in this context.
Like legislative history, 17 6 statutory construction does play
an important role in the implication process, but that role is not
one of establishing presumptions which divert a court from the
underlying rationale of implication. A court asked to imply a
private action should look to the whole act in order to determine
Congress' purpose and not merely to the sections involving
remedies and enforcement.

174 See generally O'Neil, Public Regulation and PrivateRights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV.
231, 247-48 & n.70 (1964). The article presents a good discussion of the problem of
survival of previously existing remedies, a question closely related to implication.
175 61 HARV. L. REv. 858, 864 (1948).

176 See notes 136-38 supra & accompanying text.
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3. Statutory Purpose
Although the search for statutory purpose in order to determine congressional intent is the most important process in
making the implication decision, it is the least capable of definition. Perhaps the necessary elements of this procedure can best
be illustrated by first determining what the objects of this investigation are not.
In the first place, a court should not look for evidence of a
specific legislative intent to imply a private action. As was
pointed out in the discussion of legislative history and statutory
construction, this search is unproductive because it ignores the
underlying implication rationale that there may well be a need to
supplement Congress' enforcement scheme if it has proven inadequate to accomplish the statute's goals. Requiring a search for
legislative intent to imply a private action essentially creates a
presumption against implication. 17 7 This presumption led Judge
Aldisert to conclude in his Ash dissent "that a discussion of the
necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercise through financial contributions and the recognition that corporate officials have no right to use corporate
funds improperly . . . is simply irrelevant to the narrow issue
posed by this appeal .... ,,178 This analysis is incorrect because
implication does concern itself with the broad goals of a statute.
By the same token, however, it is no more correct for a court to
raise a presumption favoring implication by conducting a limited
investigation for a specific intent to imply, concluding in the
absence of such specific intent that exclusivity was not intended
and then assuming that such non-exclusion itself justifies
1 79
implication.
An investigation of statutory purpose is not complete merely
because a court determines that the plaintiff is within the zone of
interest to be protected by the statute. Although this finding
should precede the implication of a private action,180 it is not
177 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); cf. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 20
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178 Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 428 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
I" See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1967); Burke
v.Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970).
18oSee Goodall v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (Investment Company Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970), is intended to
protect only those persons with ownership interests in investment companies and not
shareholders of a corporation in which an investment company has invested; therefore,
such shareholders do not have an implied action).
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sufficient to justify implication. That courts might find this determination to be sufficient is the most dangerous legacy of the
Borak test. 18 1 In that case the Supreme Court found that the
broad purpose of the Securities Exchange Act 8 2 in general and
section 14(a)' 8 3 in particular would support a private action, but
a
the failure of courts subsequently to stress the need for such
1 84
defective.
test
that
renders
test
Borak
the
applying
finding in
The second prong of the Borak test-whether the harm is of
the type that the statute was intended to forestall-suggests
another question to be answered by an investigation of statutory
purpose. This second consideration, although necessary for implication, is not by itself or in combination with the first prong
sufficient to justify it. Given that the rationale for implication is
the achievement of the goals for which Congress enacted the
legislation, 8 5 however, determining whether the alleged harm is
of the type to be eliminated goes a long way toward determining
what those goals are. But because the prevention of a particular
type of harm may be only one goal of a statute, investigation of
statutory purpose must go still further.
This is aptly illustrated by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Amtrak. The Court recognized that the goal of the Amtrak Act is
to preserve passenger service, which necessarily means that railroad passengers are the intended beneficiaries of the Act. The
discontinuance of a passenger route in violation of the Act thus
would be the type of harm to be forestalled by this enactment of
unified and detailed procedures for such a discontinuance. The
Supreme Court could have ended its analysis for statutory consistency here, in agreement with the Borak test. 18 6 The Court
went further, however, to recognize a second goal in the Amtrak
Act-namely, the replacement of the cumbersome and timeconsuming procedures previously in effect for the discontinuance of passenger service with a streamlined process to preserve efficient and viable passenger service. 8 7 The Court held
181 See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.

15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
183 Id. § 78n(a).
184 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967);
Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1970);
National Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
185 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
186 This was the approach taken by the Amtrak court of appeals. Potomac Passengers
Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 336-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nor.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
187 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
461-64 (1974).
182
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that this goal would be thwarted by implied actions; in addition
to prolonging the existence of uneconomical routes, 1 8 8 said the
Court, such actions would destroy the unified approach of the
Act's procedures because several suits brought in various district
courts to enjoin the discontinuance of a single route could result
in multifarious decisions.' 8 9 Although the wisdom of this analysis
may be subject to criticism, 90 it exemplifies the importance of
considering not only the harm to be prevented and the persons
to be benefited by a given statute, but also all the other reasons
which led to the enactment of the statute.
In Ash the court of appeals recognized the need to determine "whether any 'collateral' considerations counsel withholding [a private] remedy."' 9 1 Although, as the court said, "the
breadth of § 610's coverage favors enforcement solely by criminal sanctions,"'192 it "note[d] no countervailing reason for denying private remedies here."' 93 There do seem to be reasons that
might counsel against implication, however. The statute itself has
been attacked as an unconstitutional limitation upon the freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment. 94 Although the statute has not been declared unconstitutional in the
criminal context, 95 an expansion of the remedies under the Act,
which might chill freedom of expression, should be undertaken
with the utmost caution.' 96 This is particularly so because in a
civil suit burdens of proof and procedural safeguards are less
stringent, so that a person who allegedly violates the statute may
be held accountable on less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. The Ash court might have decided that, in addition to
desiring to prevent undue influence over elections by corporations, Congress had as a goal the enactment of a statute that
would withstand constitutional scrutiny, and, therefore, limited
the enforcement of the Act to criminal provisions to ensure sufficient narrowness. Implication would thwart such a goal.
'5 81 d.at 463.
189Id. at 463-64.

190See Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 337 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.

Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
191 Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 423 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
192 Id.
19
3Id. at 424.
194 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 596-98 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 130 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
196 See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17-19, Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
'5
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This is not to say the result reached by the Third Circuit is
necessarily wrong. Had the court fully dealt with this, issue, it still
might have decided that the support which an implied action
would give to the goal of removing corporate influence over
elections would offset any negative considerations regarding the
goal of constitutionality. This analysis is offered to show the
broad range of considerations that a court is obligated to investigate before it determines that an implied action is consistent with
the statutory purpose. It is, of course, impossible to list exhaustively the goals that must be considered in determining statutory
purpose; because every statute is different in scope and intent,
these considerations will vary from case to case.
In addition to determinations of who the intended beneficiaries are and what harm is intended to be prevented, one
other consideration is of sufficient importance in the implication
process to merit discussion. The major purpose behind enacting
an enforcement scheme is to deter those who would otherwise
violate the substantive provisions of an act. An implied private
remedy usually will further that aim by providing an additional
penalty to discourage would-be violators. This is one reason why
implication is often a valuable tool,' 97 but the analysis cannot end
here. Implication may prove to be too effective a tool in some
instances; it may subject a party to a penalty much too great in
proportion to his culpability. In discussing this potential result in
the analogous situation where violations of state statutes are held
to constitute negligence per se, Professor Morris stated that "if
relatively unimportant wrongs are regarded as sufficient fault to
subject defendants to large losses, the results may be tremendous
overpunishment which may be less desirable than no civil liability, particularly when it is remembered that there is criminal
liability to discourage breaches."' 9 8 When implication produces
such a burdensome penalty, it can hardly be said to be consistent
with the statutory purpose.' 9 9
It is necessary for a court to determine why Congress chose
a limited remedial scheme before determining whether implica197See Note, supra note 6, at 291.
198Morris, The Relationship of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv. 453,
469-70 (1933) (footnotes omitted); see O'Neil, supra note 174, at 263; Note, supra note 6,
at 291-92 (1963).
199It may also be said that when implication would advance the enforcement effort
beyond the level that the statute contemplates, there can be no showing of need, in that
the enforcement scheme is adequate without the implied remedy. It is at this point that
the criteria of consistency and need overlap somewhat. See text accompanying notes
204-30 infra.
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tion is consistent with that scheme. If it appears to a court that
Congress enacted an enforcement system which it thought sufficient at the time of passage, but which has proven ineffective,
implication may well be appropriate. But when it appears that
Congress intentionally limited the available remedies to accomplish a specific purpose, the scales tip against implication. This
consideration influenced the Supreme Court's decision in
T.LM.E. Inc. v. United States;2 0 0 the Court noted that the absence
of express private remedies in the Motor Carrier Act 20 1 reflected
Congress' desire to shelter the fledgling motor carrier industry
from debilitating litigation, thus rendering implication
inappropriate.2 0 2 An analysis of statutory purpose, therefore,
must include an examination of the goals intended to be served
by the statute's express enforcement scheme in order to determine if implication thwarts those goals by3 providing a remedy
20
which punishes the violator too severely.
The attempt to ascertain statutory purpose, then, demands
the close examination of a wide range of elements, the ultimate
aim being to determine whether an implied action is consistent
with and therefore appropriate to the statutory scheme. In determining whether implication is appropriate, a court must look
beyond the injured party and the harm he has allegedly suffered
to the multitude of reasons that prompted Congress to structure
the act as it did and the various goals that it sought to accomplish. Only after this investigation has been completed is a court
properly in a position to balance those aspects that favor implication against those that oppose it. If this balancing favors implication, a court must then be ready to take the next major step in
the implication process-determining whether there is a need to
supplement Congress' enforcement mechanism.
B. The Need for an Implied Action:
Evaluating the Adequacy of the Enforcement Scheme
Mr. Justice Harlan has phrased this second major step in the
implication process in terms of whether implication is necessary
to achieve the goals established by Congress.20 4 Determining the
200 359 U.S. 464 (1959).

201 Interstate Commerce Act, pt. II, §§ 200-27, 49 U.S.C. §§ 300-27 (1970).
212 359 U.S. at 477-78 n.18 (citing Hearings on S. 1310, S. 2016, S. 1869 & S. 2009

Before
the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 791-92 (1939)).
20
" See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Goodall
v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
204 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 402 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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necessity of a private right of action is peculiarly within the
power of the courts because they have the opportunity to witness
the effectiveness of the enforcement scheme in operation. 20 5 It is

through this assessment of existing remedies that a court is able
to determine if lacunae exist which require filling in order to
fulfill an act's purposes. As the Supreme Court said in Wyandotte
TransportationCo. v. United States,2 °6 inadequacy is a particularly

important reason to imply a private action lest the wrongdoer be
able to shift the burden of his violation onto the innocent
plaintiff.2 0 7 Although inadequacy is a prerequisite to implication,2 0 8 it is not sufficient to justify it. 20 9 Only after a court has

determined that a right to relief is consistent with the purposes
of an act does the question of adequacy arise.
Ironically, when this right has been found, it has generally
been assumed that "courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.

' 21 0

Once courts have acknowledged

their ability to imply actions and have recognized as a justification for that ability the need to provide remedies that Congress
did not contemplate, it does not seem surprising that they might
end their inquiry and imply a remedy upon finding that implication does not contradict the purposes of an act. The implication
of any consistent remedy, however, renders useless the criterion
that there be a need for such a remedy to accomplish the act's
goals adequately. If Congress designs an enforcement system
that proves effective in accomplishing the statutory goals, there
is no reason to supplement that system simply because the supplemental remedy is consistent with the statute. The implication
rationale puts the courts in the role of aiding Congress in the
achievement of its stated aims.
1. Statutory Inadequacy
Perhaps a grasp of what constitutes inadequacy in the enforcement of a statute can best be obtained through a compari205 See

Note, supra note 6, at 291.
(1967).

206 389 U.S. 191
207 Id. at 204.

208 See Holloway v.Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485
986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
F.2d 209
See Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972).
210 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted); see Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433 (1964). But see Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 429 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
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son of two cases virtually identical except for the question of
adequacy-T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States2 ' and Hewitt-Robins Inc.
v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc."' Both cases were brought under
section 216 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 2 1 3 which makes it
unlawful for motor carriers to charge unreasonable rates or to
ship goods via unreasonably circuitous routes. The Act does not
explicitly authorize a damage action by a shipper who has paid
an illegally excessive tariff to a carrier.
In T.LM.E. a damage action was sought by a shipper who
had been assessed allegedly excessive rates, but the Supreme
Court dismissed the action to recover these past unreasonable
charges. It based this decision in part on the fact that the shipper
could have applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission before the goods had been shipped for a determination of the
reasonableness of the rates to be charged. The plaintiff thus had
failed to take advantage of the available
enforcement device
2 4
which might have satisfied his claim. 1
In Hewitt-Robins, on the other hand, the Court implied a
damage remedy in a suit by a shipper who allegedly suffered
excessive costs because the carrier had shipped the goods via an
unreasonably circuitous route. The Court justified the result on
the ground that without the implied action the plaintiff would be
without a remedy, past or present. Although the ICC has primary jurisdiction over routes,"15 it would be impossible for a shipper to apply to the Commission for a determination before the
goods were shipped because he could not be sure just what route
the carrier would choose. Only after the shipment was made
could the shipper determine whether a potential cause of action
6
existed.2
2H 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
2 371 U.S. 84 (1962).

49 U.S.C. § 316 (1970).
359 U.S. at 478-80. The Court did not deal with the issue whether an application
to the ICC would have been an adequate remedy in fact. For a discussion of that issue,
see notes 231-63 infra & accompanying text. Such a determination was unnecessary to a
disposition of the case, however, because the plaintiffs failure to utilize this remedial
path prevented him from complaining of its inadequacy.
215 371 U.S. at 87.
216 Id. The Court further stated:
A misrouting claim does not jeopardize the stability of tariffs or of certificated
routes, the sole issue being whether the carrier routed the shipment over the
cheapest available route, or made a showing of adequate justification for not
doing so. Moreover, the allowance of misrouting actions would have a healthy
deterrent effect upon the utilization of misrouting practices in the motor carrier
field, which, in turn, would minimize "cease and desist" proceedings before the
Commission. Finally, and not to be overlooked, the absence of any judicial
213

214
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Adequacy is not necessarily to be measured solely at the time
at which suit is brought, nor is it to be measured solely by
whether a court can at some point provide the kind of relief
requested. In deciding whether a statute provides for sufficient
enforcement to prevent a court from implying an action, the
court must look to the total statutory scheme. The court must
determine whether at another time or in another forum the
plaintiff could have secured a remedy which would have prevented or redressed the injury alleged before the court,2 17 and
whether the lack of a private remedy would matter when viewed
in the context of nonremedial enforcement devices. The burden
is on the plaintiff to show the court that he has no remedy under
the act and that the conduct complained of is not otherwise
addressed in the enforcement scheme; this burden cannot be
satisfied merely by showing that as of the time of suit he is
without an action. He must show that he is without an action
because none is provided by the statute and not because he has
218
failed to pursue avenues open to him.
In those cases involving statutes that provide criminal remedies which are strictly enforced, but no corresponding civil
remedy for those injured by a violation, more complex adequacy
problems arise. The nature of these problems is highlighted by
the majority and dissenting opinions in Breitwieser v. KMS Industries, Inc.2 19 The plaintiffs in this case attempted to bring a
wrongful death action based upon a violation of the child labor
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 22 0 which contains
only penal sanctions. 22 1 In refusing to imply a private action, the
majority found the criminal enforcement scheme adequate to
punish violations of the Act and thus to deter violative
conduct. 22 2 Judge Wisdom, dissenting, challenged the reasoning
of the majority, saying that although the criminal provisions may
be sufficient to insure the public interest in the enforcement of
remedy places the shipper entirely at the mercy of the carrier, contrary to the
overriding purpose of the Act.
Id. at 88.
217 Once the court determines a remedial scheme to be inadequate on its face, it must
still look to the implementation of that scheme to see if it is adequate in fact. See notes
231-63 infra & accompanying text.
218 See Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (W.D. La. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973).
219 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973).
220 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970).
222 The plaintiff was also entitled to recover $750 in benefits from the state
workmen's
compensation bureau. 467 F.2d at 1394.
22 2
1d. at 1393-94.
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the statute's purpose, such criminal sanctions do nothing to
compensate the victim of the violation, 223 who is, after all, the
intended beneficiary of the Act. He therefore found this enforcement scheme inadequate and implication necessary.
Judge Wisdom's reasoning reflects a rule that has existed for
as long as the doctrine of implication itself-"[a] disregard of the
command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied ....*1224 In other words, when a statute is
enacted for the protection of a discernible class, it creates rights
in that class under civil law even if the only express sanctions are
criminal. 22 5 This rule resembles the common law tort rule that
the violation of a criminal statute constitutes negligence per se or
evidence of negligence, 226 and so aids an injured party to
recover. 2 27 The development of such a rule in the federal courts
might be justified if a federal general common law existed, 2
but if this were so the whole doctrine of implication would be
unnecessary because courts could deal with private rights of action through tort law, as state courts do. 229 In the absence of
federal general common law, however, we are left with the doctrine of implication. The rule proposed by Judge Wisdom allows
a court to make the implication decision without considering the
broader rationale. If the rule were employed as stated, a court
would need only to determine whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary. Although relevant, this consideration is not
sufficient to support implication.
Inadequacy must be determined by measuring the difference between the goals of an act and the actual effects. If a
statute intended the creation of personal rights, then certainly a
purely penal enforcement would be inadequate to achieve its
aims. If a statute cannot be said to have intended the granting of
personal rights, then implication may not be justified solely be123Id.at 1394-95.
224 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
225Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956);
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
22 See, e.g., Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation; 16 MINN. L. REV.
361 (1932); Morris, supra note 198.

227 In fact one federal court has said, "The disregard of the command of a statute is
a wrongful act and a tort." Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D.
Pa. 1946).
221 Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), with Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
22 9

See note 226 supra.
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cause the plaintiff has suffered some loss. On the other hand, if
Congress' penal scheme has proved a failure in accomplishing
the intended effects, the implication of a private remedial action
may well be necessary in order to correct that failure. Inadequacy must be defined with respect to the accomplishment of a
statute's aims rather
than with respect to a bare desire to grant a
23 0
victim recovery.
2. Inadequacy in Fact
The determination whether the enforcement scheme is adequate as implemented is a delicate operation in the search for
statutory adequacy; it often involves a judgment whether the
governmental unit entrusted with enforcement is performing its
obligations satisfactorily. Courts are understandably wary of
making such evaluations of the performance of a coequal branch
of the federal government charged with interpreting and apply-

ing an act after its passage. Resolution of this adequacy issue
requires answers to two questions: Why did the executive unit

entrusted with enforcement fail to take action? Would the implication of a private action interfere with that unit's ability to offer
effective relief in the future?
Sometimes agency or executive department ina "tion is not
related to the merits of an individual case. A mere ick of resources, for example, may preclude consideration of many cases
that deserve attention. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak2 3 1 the Supreme
Court noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission is a

busy agency; 232 if an implied right of action were denied, the
burden of enforcement on the Commission would be crushing.
enhance
The Court found, therefore, that a private action would233
Act.
the
and
Commission
the
of
operation
the efficient
230 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).

Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 383, 392 (1971), the granting
of an implied damages action for the violation of the fourth amendment by federal
narcotics agents stemmed from the Supreme Court's assertion that "citizens of the United
States [have] the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
carried out by virtue of federal authority."
To the extent that the constitutional aim was to protect personal rights, and to the
extent that the exclusionary rule was inadequate to accor ,lish the intended protection, a
damages remedy which was not inconsistent with the amendment was properly implied.
Cf. 53 TExAs L. REv. 168, 170 (1974).
231377 U.S. 426 (1964).
232

Id. at 432; cf. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 470 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 423-24 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
233 377 U.S. at 332-33; cf. Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 413-14 (E.D. La.
1969) (private action for damages resulting from allegedly unlawful dismissal would free
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Other instances of inadequate enforcement might be traced
to the enforcer's view that the statute limits the enforcement
role, whether or not such is actually the case. In Amtrak, for
example, the Attorney General, although specifically granted a
right of action to seek "such equitable relief as may be necessary
or appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation, conduct, or
threat, '23 4 believed that he had no authority "to sue for a construction of the Act or to enjoin a purely technical violation," but
only to bring suits "to protect and enhance the legislative
purpose. '23 5 When the enforcing agency takes a narrow view of
its authority, it clearly will fail to treat on its merits a case which
is outside the perceived scope of that authority. If a right is
provided by the statute, it will therefore go unremedied unless
an action is implied in those situations deemed purely "technical
violations.

'236

A third possible reason the enforcement agency might fail to
act is lack of enthusiasm for or, even worse, active opposition to
the provisions in question. The failure of the Civil Aeronautics
Board to take action on a complaint alleging discrimination by
an airline apparently prompted one court not only to imply an
23 7
Simiaction but also to award the plaintiff punitive damages.

larly, in Ash v. Cort,23 8 the majority was influenced by the conflict
of interest that might have prompted the Justice Department to
be less than diligent in prosecuting contribution violations. Because the Attorney General had been appointed by the very
official whose election was allegedly facilitated by the challenged
2 39
expenditures, the court found his motives subject to question.
This speculation into the motive behind agency inaction, if
engaged in at all, must be done with utmost care. A mere allegation that such inaction is the result of impropriety should not be
sufficient to warrant a finding of inadequacy. 2 40 If the plaintiff
Secretary of Labor from the need to pursue minor cases under § 15(a)(3) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970).
234 Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act) § 307, 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
23 Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) (quoting Letter from Assistant Attorney General L. Patrick Gray,
III, to Congressman John Slack, Nov. 19, 1971); see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, supra at 470 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
236 The Supreme Court did not have to address this question because it determined
that no private rights existed. See notes 69-72 supra & accompanying text.
237 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 364-65, 367-68 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
238 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
239
Id. at 423 & n.7.
240 Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 302 (1974).
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wishes to assert such impropriety he should be required to
demonstrate it with proper evidence at the implication stage of
the litigation. A court cannot wait until the trial on the merits to
decide this issue because once an action is implied, the actual
reason for the agency inaction becomes immaterial. When courts
begin to imply causes of action because of potential impropriety,
as the court did in Ash, 2 4 1 they introduce into the implication
process an element of suspiciousness which seems highly inappropriate where one branch of the federal government is asked
to review the decisions of a coequal branch. The mere possibility
of impropriety is not in fact tantamount to inadequacy.
In approaching the adequacy-in-fact question, courts should
presume that inaction on the part of the enforcement agency or
department is a result of a reasoned, objective application of the
relevant statute. Only a positive showing that such is not the case
can rebut this presumption. 242 A contrary presumption would
trammel agency discretion and nullify the congressional enforcement scheme. Implication is a supplement
to that enforce3
ment scheme, not a means of subverting it.24
The need for this presumption is further supported by the
broader considerations present in an implication case. A court
asked to imply a cause of action must look beyond the case at
bar, for its decision will not merely interpret a statute or apply or
extend existing common law rules, but will create a totally new
cause of action. If a court finds an allegation of improper motive
sufficient to warrant implication in one case, it may have implied
an action absent true inadequacy in enforcement, thus encouraging future litigants to resort to the courts in situations where
agency proceedings would have been wholly effective to resolve
the dispute in question.
A second consideration in determining adequacy-in-fact follows from the above discussion: Will implication of a private
cause of action interfere with the ability of the agency to enforce
the statute effectively in the future? Determining whether a private action would interfere with agency enforcement is a balancing process. Weighing against implication are considerations
such as whether a private action would disrupt the agency's operations or dull the incentive to seek administrative action,
whether the uniformity that an agency can provide is necessary
"41 496 F.2d at 423 n.7.
242

Cf. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 113 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974).

243 See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973);

Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930
(1959).
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for effective enforcement, and whether a private action would
destroy that uniformity. 24 4 Favoring implication are the potential
the inability
deterrent value of such a supplementary action and
2 45
of the agency to offer completely effective relief.
An excellent example of how this balancing occurs is Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.246 In that case the court was urged to
imply a private action under section 12(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "any false advertisement
• . . which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase
of... drugs .... ,,247 The court determined that the FTC was
created by Congress to provide a consistent and flexible enforcement scheme which requires the Commission to exercise
discretion in applying the Act. After listing the considerations
that guide the exercise of that discretion, the court concluded:
"Above all, there is need to weigh each action against the
Commission's broad range policy goals and to determine its
place in the overall enforcement program of the FTC. 2 48 Private actions would seriously impede the ability of the FTC to
exercise this discretion. Moreover, the various federal courts that
would be deciding the cases might not always render consistent
judgments. This result would negate the Commission's ability to
develop orderly precedent and to fulfill its important enforce249
ment role of offering competent advice to advertisers.
Additionally, the FTC had been granted a broad range of
remedial devices in contrast to the limited and often blunt
remedies available to a court. In fashioning relief in an individual suit, a court might not fully consider the broad public
goals central to the FTC's discretion. 250 Thus, despite the countervailing considerations that without implication plaintiff would
not have a federal damage remedy, that an implied action would
indeed have a deterrent effect, and that the Commission allegedly lacked sufficient resources to provide effective
enforcement,2 5 ' the court held that a private action would be
inappropriate.
Potential conflicts between judicial and administrative action
occur quite frequently when implication of a private action
244 For a broader discussion of these considerations in connection with the related
problem of when pre-existing remedies survive the passage of an act, see O'Neil, supra
note 174, at 258-70 (1964).
245 See Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112-14 (9th Cir. 1974).
246 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
247 15 U.S.C. § 52(a)(1) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 52(a)(1) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
248 485 F.2d at 997.
249 Id. at 997-98.
250 Id. at 998.
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would require a court to decide an issue that would normally be
decided in the first instance by an agency. This is the problem of
primary jurisdiction. If courts were to make such decisions, an
agency could no longer be master in its own house and courts
would be faced with unfamiliar problems requiring the application of unusual standards.2

52

Such an undesirable result need

implication,2 5 3

however, because a court confronted with
not bar
issues falling within the primary jurisdiction of an agency can
refer those issues to the appropriate agency for initial determination, and then resolve the remaining issues consistently with
that determination. "[T]he attitude of the court should remain
flexible toward the question of referral, and the requirements of
primary jurisdiction, however onerous, should rarely justify
turning away the aggrieved party without a remedy that would
otherwise be available. 25 4
Nevertheless, courts have used the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to prevent implication, saying that if an issue is
within the primary jurisdiction of an agency and that agency
could not offer the requested relief, neither may a court grant
relief.25 5 This is a rather curious result in that the primary
reason for implication in such a situation would be the inability
of the agency to offer adequate enforcement in the first place.
The extent to which the primary jurisdiction bar is to be relied
upon is questionable, because in those cases which have invoked
it other grounds have existed to prevent implication. 25 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has chosen not to apply the rule
where to do so would leave the plaintiff without a sorely needed
remedy. 257 This rule is thus doubtful not only on policy grounds,
but on precedential grounds as well. Whatever its vitality, the
primary jurisdiction doctrine should not be sufficient, standing
by itself, to bar implication where it is otherwise appropriate.
251Id. at 999-1001.
252 See Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d

497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1950).
253Note, supra note 6, at 295.
254 O'Neil, supra note 174, at 274.
255 See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1959); Montana-Dakota
Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951); Danna v. Air France,
334 F. Supp. 52, 58-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972). But see
Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 87-88 (1962); T.I.M.E.
Inc. v. United States, supra at 483 (Black, J., dissenting).
56E.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
254-55 (1951) (because plaintiff could pass on excessive costs to ultimate consumer, it is
questionable whether he was damaged at all).
257 Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 87-89 (1962); see
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 493-94 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
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One final question of adequacy must be answered: Are the
state remedies that survive adoption of the federal statute sufficiently adequate to defeat implication? In answering this question it must first be noted that if Congress has designed an act so
as to balance federal and state enforcement, it would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose to imply an action which would
disrupt that intended balance.2 5 8 Where statutory inconsistency
is not raised, courts have generally recognized that although the
availability of a state action should be considered, there are
strong policies favoring a federal cause of action.2 59 Perhaps the
primary justification for a federal remedy, regardless of the availability of state relief, is lack of uniformity. Although the jurisdiction whose law would apply in a given case may indeed provide
a sufficient remedy, other jurisdictions may not be so liberal.
If a court rules out implication because of the adequacy of a
particular state remedy, it may have set a precedent that will put
plaintiffs in other jurisdictions in the position of having no
forum. 2 60 State common law remedies, if they exist, are not automatically available for a violation of the federal act; although
the state cause of action may remedy a fairly analogous injury,
26 1 Notions of uniformity 262
the similarity will rarely be complete.
and the feeling that federal rights should be accompanied by
federal remedies 2 63 further support implication even where state
remedies are available. Surviving state remedies therefore must
be considered in assessing adequacy, but before refusing to
imply an action, a court must be sure that the surviving state
remedies are in fact generally available and are of the same or
broader scope as the proposed federal private action.
Whereas the investigation into statutory purpose focuses
upon the act itself and upon the intention of Congress in passing
that act, the inquiry into adequacy focuses upon the reality of the
act's effect. After implication has been found consistent with a
statute, the adequacy test determines if implication is necessary
Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 263-65 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
258 Cf. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2

-9 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 n.12 (9th Cir. 1974).
260 See Note, supra note 6, at 292-93.
261 This is dramatically illustrated by the growth
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 10(b)
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which has provided
state law analogue-deceit.
262 See Note, supra note 6, at 292-93.
26
3 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).

434-35 (1964); Stewart v. Travelers
of actions under rule lOb-5 of the
of the Securities Exchange Act of
a far broader basis for suit than its
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to realize the act's purpose. This is not simply a determination
whether the present plaintiff has a remedy for the alleged injury; rather, a court must examine the whole enforcement
scheme, remedial or penal, to see whether an implied action
would help to bring about what Congress has intended but failed
to achieve.
V.

CONCLUSION

A court requested to find an implied private right of action
in a federal statute must recognize not only what inquiries are
appropriate, but also what inquiries are inappropriate. In deciding the question of implication a court should determine, first,
whether an implied action would be inconsistent with Congress'
goals in enacting the legislation and, second, whether the enforcement scheme provided has proven inadequate to accomplish those goals-that is, whether there is a need for the action
sought to be implied. It is important that a court not focus exclusively upon the beneficiaries of an act but instead fully examine
the act's broad purposes. Such an examination should not include a search for a congressional intent to permit implication,
because the underlying rationale of implication presumes an enforcement inadequacy which has arisen after the passage of an
act. Similarly, reliance upon the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is unwise in that it unrealistically assumes that Congress
was able at the time of a statute's enactment to envision the
effects of the provided enforcement scheme and thus to intend
the rejection of certain remedies by failing to speak to them.
For the nearly sixty years since the doctrine of implication
was enunciated in Texas & PacificRailway Co. v. Rigsby,2 64 federal
courts have bounded from overly broad tests which would support implication in almost every federal statute to narrow rules
of construction which would threaten the continued existence of
implied actions. It is time for courts to face this undesirable
situation and to fashion a single, unified test for implication
which eliminates per se rules and ill-founded presumptions,
adopting instead standards which more accurately reflect the
rationale for implication.
264

241 U.S. 33 (1916).

